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This paper has two basic aims: the first is to understand why networks matter in the creation
and maintenance of social capital; the second is to explore many of the (unproved) assump-
tions that arise when social capital is applied to the field of political participation. A simula-
tion-based experiment is used to achieve both aims. The paper starts by delimiting the scope
of the theoretical problem. It then reviews the assumptions made in the literature about the
role networks play for social capital, and integrates them with what is known about dynamic
networks. The third section provides a brief introduction to the methodological nature of
simulation. It justifies the appropriateness of this technique to tackle the questions posed by
the existing theory. A description of the simulation model and its results follows. The first
set of experiments explores the structural properties of different networks in respect of infor-
mation diffusion. The second set analyses a principle of action that might be responsible for
the formation of social capital networks. The implications that these results have for the the-
ory are assessed in the conclusion. Their links to future research are also discussed.
Key words: social capital, networks, political participation, multi-agent simulation.
Resumen. El papel de la redes dinámicas en el capital social: un experimento de simulación
El objetivo de este artículo es doble: por un lado, entender por qué importan las redes en
la creación y mantenimiento de capital social y, por otro, explorar muchas de las asuncio-
nes (no probadas) que surgen cuando el concepto de capital social se aplica al campo de
la participación política. Ambos objetivos se llevan a cabo con la ayuda de un experimen-
to de simulación. El artículo empieza exponiendo los términos del problema teórico.
Prosigue con un resumen de las asunciones que aparecen en la literatura sobre el rol que
las redes juegan en el funcionamiento del capital social y las contrasta con lo que se sabe acer-
ca del funcionamiento de redes dinámicas. La tercera sección proporciona una breve intro-
ducción a la naturaleza metodológica de la simulación multi-agente. Le sigue una des-
cripción del modelo de simulación y de sus resultados. El primer conjunto de experimentos
explora las propiedades estructurales de distintas redes respecto a la difusión de información.
El segundo conjunto analiza un principio de acción responsable de la formación de redes
de capital social. Las implicaciones teóricas de estos resultados son valoradas en la conclu-
sión. También se discuten futuras líneas de investigación.
Palabras clave: capital social, redes, participación política, simulación multi-agente.
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Theories of social capital have long stressed the importance of interpersonal
networks. These provide people with non-economic resources (status, recog-
nition, trust, information) from which they can benefit whilst simultane-
ously advantaging the community as a whole. Investing in social relations
pays in the form of rewards, real or potential, that individuals can obtain
from their networks in a diversity of markets: educational (Coleman 1988),
labour (Lin and Dumin 1986), economic (Portes 1993) and political (Putnam
1995). Social ties allow the flow of information and resources, and they are
thus valuable both as a stock of support and as transmission channels. They
are also the raw material of reciprocity and trust: these can only be main-
tained when interactions take place in sufficiently dense networks, that is,
when it becomes possible to monitor individuals’ reputation. Social capital is
thus a unique mixture of structure and content (Degenne and Forsé 1999,
p. 116), a concept that aims to capture the nature of social interactions
through which, paraphrasing Mandeville, private vices can become public
benefits. It is in the field of political participation that this twofold dimension
finds a highly relevant example. The idea that social capital promotes demo-
cratic virtue and civic engagement, popularised by Putnam a decade ago
(Putnam 1995; Putnam 2000; Putnam et al. 1993), has become a common
place in sociology.
Yet there is no agreed explanation about why interpersonal networks are
powerful in the creation of social capital, let alone in the promotion of democ-
racy. Many authors claim network density and closure are fundamental, but
this denies the significance of other features like bridges, structural holes and
weak ties (Lin 2001, p. 27). On the other hand, there is some analytical evidence
against the idea that dense networks of interaction lead to a reduction of oppor-
tunism: when transmitting information, these can actually increase free-rid-
ing (Lazer 2003). This paper aims to shed light on the role that the structural
dimension of social capital plays by answering the following questions: why,
and to what extent, are dynamic networks an important aspect of social cap-
ital? And what can we learn about the behavioural rules underlying the emer-
gence of social capital networks? Social simulation opens the experimental
framework within which to explore the implications that different rules of
interaction have for the emerging structures. These can then be empirically
tested in order to narrow down the range of possible (and plausible) mecha-
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tematic analysis.
2. The Assumptions: the Impact of Networks on Political Participation
Social capital theory highlights the importance of social ties for the informa-
tion and resources they can bring to individuals. When applied to the politi-
cal context, social capital theory also emphasises how important social ties are
for the rules of conduct they help to promote (Herreros 2000). Networks
are assumed to have positive externalities that go beyond the benefits indi-
viduals pursue: they promote norms of generalised reciprocity and the emer-
gence of trust, they facilitate coordination and communication, they con-
tribute to the spread of political expertise, they reduce opportunism and foster
collaboration and they enhance the participant’s «taste» for collective benefits
(Putnam 2000, p. 20-22). The level of connectedness of networks is alleged
to «aid in the maintenance of democracy by ensuring that political participa-
tion is tolerant, moderate and publicly oriented» (Paxton 1999, p. 102). The
basic assumption is that, for a variety of reasons, entangled individuals are
more inclined towards the public good than isolated ones.
However, neither Putnam nor his disciples manage to give an explanation
of how and why all these processes take place: their approach to networks,
based on proxies such as group membership, gives them an insufficient base
to sustain their argument. The number and type of groups membership are
used to estimate the general level of associations and these, in turn, to esti-
mate the overall density of civic networks (Paxton 1999, p. 101). But there is
no census of ties within and between associations, so the theoretical assump-
tions about the role networks play are based on a measure of network that
does not resemble a network at all. Putnam and his disciples cannot prove
that social capital ties have good political consequences because their approach
to networks is simply misleading. All they can show is a correlation between
membership and political action with no structural component.
This weakness is actually one of the consequences of a wider method-
ological problem: the absence of a satisfactory causal theory of the relation-
ship between social capital and observed behavioural patterns (Durlauf 2002).
In his approach, Putnam «fails to account for the ways in which phenomena
such as levels of trust in a society are endogenous outcomes of social relations»
(Ibid., p. 263). This lack of causal mechanism results in conceptual ambigui-
ty and compels a purely exogenous treatment of social capital. When social
capital is treated exogenously, the theory becomes just another instance of cul-
tural explanation: subjective orientations are arbitrarily considered more impor-
tant than the objective conditions in which they arise (Jackman and Miller
1998). Building a theory on this assumption is problematic in itself. But it is
especially problematic when applied to the analysis of social capital, that is, to
the operationalisation of a concept that was explicitly intended to capture the
importance of the structure in which individuals are embedded.
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systematically (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998). In these approaches, the
US Cross National Election Project from 1992 is used to provide information
about 1286 personal networks. These networks consist of up to five discus-
sants with whom respondents talked about important matters, including pol-
itics. The results show that political engagement is a function of the size of
the network, the political expertise of its members and the frequency of inter-
action between them. Those individuals with larger networks, with higher lev-
els of expertise and greater frequency of interactions report participation in a
wider variety of political activities. Thesse include working for a party or can-
didate, attending meetings, displaying political signs, donating money or sim-
ply voting. The article suffers, though, from two interrelated flaws: one involves
the theory; the other concerns the data.
First: This interpretation assumes that networks of social relations are
responsible for the transmission of political information and expertise (Ibid.,
p. 570). Networks are said to serve the fundamental purpose of decreasing the
information costs associated with political participation and therefore of pro-
moting it. Yet there is no explanation of why: it is assumed without further
discussion that networks facilitate the flow of information whatever their struc-
ture. What is more, the study does not provide information about a global
structure: it is based on data about ego centric networks, that is, about net-
works that are isolated from each other (see figure 1). And second: respon-
dents were allowed to name less than five discussants, but not more. Real per-
sonal networks might thus be richer than what the study shows. The approach
to networks is here more explicit, but there is still no proper structural com-
ponent to verify (or falsify) the background assumptions.
Traditional network analysis, on the other hand, takes into account the
full importance of network structural properties to the transmission of infor-
Figure 1. Ego centric networks embedded in an unknown global structure
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tions that individuals hold in the global network, a structural location that
gives them a more or less privileged access to resources. As figure 2 shows,
some individuals (here represented with dark nodes) are in a much better
position than others, despite having the same number of ties. Networks can
provide individuals with two types of competitive advantage: one through clo-
sure and one through brokerage (Burt 2000). In the first type, the advantage
comes from the management of risk: closed networks enhance communica-
tion and facilitate the enforcement of sanctions. In the second type, the advan-
tage comes from information access and control: networks with structural
holes allow some individuals to control information flow between two seg-
ments of the network that would otherwise be isolated.
That structure matters is one of the core claims of social capital research.
However, Granovetter, Milgram and Coleman all discovered, long before the
social capital literature emerged, significant properties of social networks topol-
ogy: their classic «weak ties», «six degrees» and innovation diffusion studies
make clear how important structure is for the dynamics that take place on a
network (Coleman et al. 1957; Granovetter 1973; Milgram 1967). Still they
had little to say about the mechanisms underlying those processes. In tradi-
tional network analysis agents are not given the opportunity to interact and
change the structure they are occupying through their interactions. The extent
to which cooperation and reciprocity contribute to creating the structure of
the network is something these studies do not consider. Yet, both cooperation
and reciprocity are assumed to be basic building blocks for the construction
of politically relevant social capital.
More concerned with dynamic networks than with social capital, a num-
ber of studies have provided analytical evidence about how the topology of
Figure 2. The importance of positions within a global network structurenetworks relates to the processes that take place within them (Barabási 2002;
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some social networks are found to be scale free and to have «small world» prop-
erties. Scale free networks are networks without a characteristic scale in their
connectivity: they do not have an average node because their degree distribu-
tion does not follow a bell curve (most nodes having the same number of links)
but a power law (where there are very many nodes with only a few links and
a few hubs with a large number). Small world networks are networks that (fol-
lowing Milgram’s research) make it possible to connect a node with any other
node in the network in only a few steps. Scale free networks also show some
interesting properties: they are a «cheaper» means to get the small world phe-
nomena (they require fewer ties to attain the six degrees of separation) and
they are more robust to failures (less likely to be disrupted by broken ties).
How fast and efficiently information and resources spread will therefore depend
on these network structural properties. Whether social capital networks repro-
duce them is, again, something that remains untested.
Some authors have explored the impact of networks in the emergence of
norms and conventions (Delgado 2002; Lazer 2003; Stocker et al. 2001; Stocker
et al. 2002). Others have considered a range of possible mechanisms underly-
ing the emergence of dynamic networks (Conte et al. 1998; Hummon 2000;
Skyrms and Pemantle 2000). But the implications these findings have for social
capital research have not yet been explored. We do not yet know whether polit-
ically relevant social networks are scale free. We also cannot demonstrate that
they are «small world» due to a lack of data about the global structure of civic
communities. The existing research, though, suggests some facts about social
capital networks: we know that individuals are influenced in their political
engagement by the characteristics of those that surround them (La Due Lake
and Huckfeldt 1998); we know that weak ties serve individuals’ goals while
linking a diversity of interests that would otherwise be unrelated (Boissevain
1978); and we know that failure to build those ties has negative political con-
sequences, such as the loss of common experience and a consequent frag-
mentation of society (Sunstein 2001). A simulation experiment can help us
build a deeper insight and thus lead to substantive developments in theory
and focussed data collection.
3. The Methodology of Simulation
In order to overcome the methodological limitations of traditional approaches
to social capital discussed above, this paper makes use of simulation, a com-
puter-based modelling strategy that allows experimentation with dynamic net-
works (González 2004). A multi-agent system is built in order to test, first,
the structural properties of different networks and their relative efficiency in the
diffusion of information; and, second, a principle of action that could under-
lie the emergence of social capital networks.
Multi-agent systems (MAS) are systems in which agents are distributed in an
artificial environment and are able to interact with each other and/or with the
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erality and diverse applications, there are four basic characteristics that define a
MAS: their compromise with methodological individualism; their ability to model
‘invisible hand’ processes; their assumption of bounded rationality in agent inter-
actions; and their ability to capture emergent, counter-intuitive processes.
The first characteristic, their compromise with methodological individu-
alism, makes MAS especially concerned with micro dynamics of agent inter-
actions: they are given priority over the macro level, which is assumed to derive
from them. In MAS most of the activities are performed by agents who inter-
act with each other and display heterogeneous rules of behaviour (Epstein and
Axtell 1996, p. 4). Social structures and group dynamics emerge from the
interaction of agents which only process local information. This approach is
related to the second characteristic of MAS: their ability to model «invisible
hand» dynamics where information is not processed globally by a central
authority but locally by a swarm of interacting units. MAS are especially well
suited to analyse complexity, that is, those patterns of global behaviour diffi-
cult to predict mathematically because large numbers of actors with changing
patterns of interaction are involved in the process (Axelrod 1997, p. 3). Since
social capital is usually treated as an example of spontaneous order, the use of
MAS is a natural framework for its analysis.
The third characteristic of MAS is their assumption of bounded rationality
in agent interactions. MAS make it possible to construct models where indi-
vidual agents apply heuristic strategies to make effective use of their imperfect
knowledge (Gilbert and Doran 1994). The rationale behind individual investment
in social relations is empirically closer to the situation of bounded rationality
than to the omniscient nature imputed to economic agents. This technique has
advantages over other approaches such as rational choice theory. Analysing the
conditions under which trust and cooperation (the building blocks of social ca-
pital) emerge is one of the objectives of game theory. But the only structural
constraints game theoretical models take into account are those which can be
expressed in terms of payoffs. MAS allow the introduction of more realistic envi-
ronments that impose structural constraints on individual choices. Finally, MAS
are characterised by their ability to capture emergent, counterintuitive processes.
Emergence is associated with complex systems, dense networks of interactions and
non-linearity, that is, with those features that make it difficult to predict the evo-
lution of a system (Holland 1998, p. 225-231). A classical example of emer-
gence can be found in Schelling’s segregation models (Schelling 1969; Schelling
1971; Schelling, 1978): agents do not seek segregation in their local interactions,
but the system finds its equilibrium in a segregated state.
All of these properties make MAS particularly well suited to the analysis
of social capital networks. But, above all, they make MAS well suited to the
search for explanatory causes: this strategy «moves away from a correlative
approach —based on quantitative variables— and towards a processual approach
based on social mechanisms» (Chattoe 2000, p. 1). Most of the research on
social capital, oriented towards statistical models based on aggregated vari-
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out mechanisms, social capital assumptions become a petitio principii, that is,
a fallacy where conclusions are taken for granted in the premises.
4. The Simulation Experiment
This simulation experiment is a preliminary approach to understanding the
dynamics underlying social capital. In particular, its aim is to test the assump-
tions made in the literature about how networks benefit democracy. These
assumptions can be summarised in the following terms:
(i) External effects:
i. Networks allow political information flow (Paxton 1999; Putnam 1995;
Putnam 2000).
ii. Networks reduce information costs (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998).
(ii) Internal effects:
i. Networks promote cooperation and «public spiritedness» (Paxton 1999;
Putnam 1995; Putnam 2000).
ii. Networks contribute to spreading the practical skills necessary to take
part in public life (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998; Verba et al. 1995).
In these assumptions, voluntary associations and the consequent network
dimension of social capital are said to contribute to democracy in two differ-
ent ways: «they have ‘external’ effects on the larger polity, and they have ‘inter-
nal’ effects on participants themselves. Externally (…) political information
flows through social networks, and in these networks public life is discussed
(…) Internally (…) networks of civic engagement instil in their members
habits of cooperation and public spiritedness, as well as the practical skills nec-
essary to partake in public life» (Putnam 2000, p. 338). The first type of effect
deals with the structure of networks; the second, with their content.
Underlying this, there is another assumption: that «an individual’s informal
friendships with old schoolmates, fellow workers, or the friend of a friend can
create social capital through increased communication, information diffusion,
and social support» (Paxton 1999, p. 100). The connectedness of the overall net-
work is assumed to enrich information flow and, with this, the pool of ideas and
interests that have to be publicly defended. Networks are said to contribute
to the existence of a forum where everybody has the chance to spread their
views. They are also assumed to warrant lower information costs and, therefore,
greater political engagement: «politically relevant social capital should enhance
the likelihood of individual engagement in politics, enabling citizens to become
engaged in ways they might otherwise not» (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998,
p. 570).
This external dimension is complemented by its internal effects. Networks
are said to promote information diffusion and political participation, but also
trustworthiness and cooperation: «Dense social ties facilitate gossip and other
valuable ways of cultivating reputation» (Putnam 2000, p. 21). Networks facil-
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lic life (Verba et al. 1995, p. 304). In this literature, it is not only «civic virtues»
that matter, but also other technical (and more mundane) skills such as learn-
ing how to value and assess arguments, how to work out opinions or how to
develop ideas. Social capital, to sum up, is alleged to benefit democracy by
educating its citizens, by putting them together and making them learn from
each other. In other words, the core assumption in the literature is that social
capital «serves to enhance human capital on the cheap» (La Due Lake and
Huckfeldt 1998, p. 581). The experiments that follow are an attempt to delim-
it the extent to which networks can be made responsible of these effects.
4.1. The Model: Network Structure
This set of experiments has a twofold aim: to illustrate why the structure of
networks is important for the processes they hold, and to show how simulation
can contribute to bridge the gaps that undermine the empirical data. In so
doing, simulation brings into focus the kind of data that should be collected
to make empirical research more informative. It also uncovers theoretical flaws
that would go unnoticed otherwise. The experiments are based on the data
provided by La Due Lake (1998) and on the scale free networks research. The
results show that there is more to diffusion effects than just the density of net-
works: the distribution of ties, and its impact in the overall structure, also plays
a significant role in the efficiency of the diffusion process.
The starting point of the simulation is, thus, the distribution of personal net-
works provided by the 1992 Cross National Election Project (Ibid.). For com-
putational reasons, the number of agents with political discussants was reduced
by a factor of 10, but the distribution is based on the same percentages. Table 1
shows the number of agents in the model with the corresponding number of
political discussants.
As mentioned above, to test the theoretical assumptions of social capital
we need a global structure, not just 127 isolated ego networks. The easiest way
to put these personal networks together is to establish random links between
the agents. Three possible scenarios are tested: one in which only hubs can be
Table 1. Personal Network Size of Agents (hubs).
Number of Political Discussants (alters) Freq %
0 11 8.4
1 22 17.4
2 20 15.4
3 24 18.7
4 23 18.4
5 27 21.7
Total 127 100.00
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which only hubs can be linked but this time with any other agent.
The structural properties of the emerging networks are quantified, fol-
lowing Watts and Strogatz (1998), by their average path length and cluster-
ing coefficients. The average path length is the number of edges in the short-
est path between two agents. This coefficient measures how far away an agent
is from any other agent in the network. The clustering coefficient is the mean
of the clustering coefficient of all actors, which measures the density of their
neighbourhood. This coefficient measures the extent to which someone’s friends
are also each others friends. Finally, the third coefficient, density, measures the
number of existing ties divided by the total number of possible ties. In order
to obtain these coefficients, the simulated networks were exported to UCINET.
The results for the three scenarios are summarised in table 2.
The number of weak ties each agent is allowed to have is a parameter in
the range from 1 to 5: the more weak ties, the more access to other groups,
and therefore, to information and diversity. The results are intuitive: a net-
work where all agents are allowed to establish weak ties with any other agent
has a higher density and, consequently, a shorter average distance between any
pair of nodes. In this simulated network of nearly 500 agents —the 127 hubs
and their respective discussants— allowing one weak tie per agent (independent
of their position) results in each agent being only seven steps away from every
other in the global network.
Some tentative conclusions can be drawn from these results: promoting
casual encounters (the basis for weak ties), and doing so regardless of the char-
acteristics of individuals, brings people closer. This is indeed the baseline for bet-
ter democracies: having access to a wide array of people makes it possible to
consider issues that would otherwise be ignored and, therefore, to revise views
in the light of what is learned. The promotion of casual encounters (the pro-
motion of weak ties) guarantees general access to heterogeneous citizens, and
also a shared exposure to diverse views and experiences. Both are necessary
conditions to maintain a deliberative democracy (Sunstein 2001, p. 30-31),
Figure 3. Three Rules to Establish Weak Ties.
Scenario 1: hubs with hubs Scenario 2: all with all Scenario 3: hubs with all
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ism for a better democracy.
But assuming that all agents have the same number of weak ties also means
assuming that they can spend the same amount of time and effort in build-
ing them, which is not very realistic. So another simulation was run for sce-
nario 2 (the one that is intuitively closer to a civic network in a democratic
society) distributing the number of weak ties randomly. The results are shown
in table 3.
This time, each agent can have between 0 and n weak ties (where n is set
as a parameter), linking them to any other agents in the same network. When
the maximum is set to five, something interesting happens: with up to five
weak ties (additional to the strong ties distributed at the initialisation), agents
build a network with the same structural properties, in terms of distance and
cliquishness, as the network that emerged giving each agent three weak ties.
In other words: with less density (with fewer ties), the same cliquishness and
nearly the same path distance are obtained. A network with up to five weak
ties per agent is «cheaper» than a network in which every agent is given three
of them because fewer ties are needed. But since the path length is very simi-
lar, it is equally efficient when transmitting information: the number of edges
a piece of news has to cross to reach any two agents in the network is almost
the same.
Table 2. Network Properties for the Three Scenarios.
Distance Clustering Coefficient
Number of Density (average path length) (cliquishness)
Weak Ties S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
1 0.0036 0.0051 0.0036 8.025* 7.236* 12.059* 0.000 0.003 0.006
2 0.0041 0.0072 0.0041 7.141* 5.013* 11.501* 0.002 0.006 0.000
3 0.0047 0.0092 0.0047 5.618* 4.214* 7.379* 0.013 0.010 0.002
4 0.0052 0.0114 0.0052 4.921* 3.758 6.407* 0.013 0.012 0.006
5 0.0057 0.0134 0.0057 4.566 3.476 5.745* 0.019 0.012 0.005
* among reachable pairs.
Table 3. Random Distribution of Ties in Scenario 2.
Number of Distance Clustering Coefficient
Weak Ties Density (average path length) (cliquishness)
Up to 5 0.0081 4.775* 0.010
Up to 6 0.0093 4.332* 0.010
Up to 7 0.0102 4.147* 0.011
Up to 8 0.0113 3.895* 0.012
Up to 9 0.0128 3.662 0.015
* among reachable pairs.
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help to resolve their empirical relevance, but such data is not available. Still
these results allow the examination of Putnam’s theoretical conclusions in a
different light. He might be right when he points out that a decrease in the
level of associationism brings a parallel decrease in the density of civic net-
works. Yet he might go too far when he concludes that less density also means
less efficiency: the distribution of ties also contributes to the production of
efficiency, a contribution that Putnam ignores. A lower density does not nec-
essarily mean that civic networks do not accomplish their function of spread-
ing political information any more. They might be accomplishing it even bet-
ter if the right number of individuals have the right number of connections. The
link between level of associationism, networks, and democracy is not as straight-
forward as social capital literature assumes.
How are weak ties distributed in the simulation? Since the distribution of
ties is random, agents get them more or less evenly: the proportion of agents
with one weak tie is, roughly, the same as the proportion of agents with two,
three, four or five weak ties. Yet, according to some research (Barabási 2002),
the distribution of ties in social networks follows a power law distribution,
which can be seen in figure 4.
To work with this distribution we must make an assumption about the
size of the tail. In order to experiment with the power law distribution, three
other simulations were run. Table 4 shows the results.
What these experiments show is that even with lower density (that is, with
fewer ties), we can get a very similar average path distance and clustering coef-
ficient to that which occurs when agents have more ties each. The message is,
again, that what matters is not how much individuals are connected but rather
Figure 4. Power Law Distribution of Ties.
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actually what the small world phenomena is about: «it means that a very small
number of people are linked to everyone else in a few steps, and the rest of us
are linked to the world through those special few» (Gladwell 2001, p. 37).
These highly connected individuals have an influence disproportionate to their
number (Watts 2003, p. 105). But given that information is a public good,
these «aristocratic» (Buchanan 2002, p. 161) networks turn out to be benefi-
cial for everybody.
Why are these findings important? Because the dynamics that take place
on networks depend on their structure. And their structure determines whether
the alleged effects of social capital are true or not. So far it has been shown that
a higher density does not necessarily translate into better network conditions
for the flow of political information or the spread of resources. In order to give
additional illustration, and to test how structure affects dynamics, a very simple
diffusion process is introduced into the simulation. Agents are given an attribute
that models a political idea with two possible values: 0 or 1. The first could
stand for «The Government knew Irak had WMD1», and the second could stand
for «The Government made up the whole story about the WMD». Agents are
initialised with the attribute value 0, and only one of them, chosen randomly,
has attribute value 1. This agent can then transmit the idea to the agents linked
to it, independently of the strength of their ties. Every time step, agents with
idea 1 do the same with their contacts, and so on until the diffusion stops.
This process is simulated in scenario 2 under the three different weak ties
distributions explored above. The results of the diffusion are shown in figure 5.
The slope of the curves during the initial time steps is largely a result of
the personal network of the introducing agent. But the tendencies are
clear: the «up to five» network allows the idea to reach everybody at the same
time as the network where all agents have three weak ties. In other words: a
network with lower density obtains the same results, and the same efficien-
cy, as a network with more ties. In the power-law network with an even
smaller density, the diffusion process takes a bit longer —one additional
1. Weapons for Massive Destruction.
Table 4. Power-Law Distribution of Ties in Scenario 2.
Agents with Agents with Distance Clustering 
< 4 > 15 (average Coefficient
Weak Ties Weak Ties Density path length) (cliquishness)
55 % 4% 0.0122 3.794 0.014
75 % 2% 0.0099 4.213 0.014
90 % 1% 0.0079 4.854* 0.010
* among reachable pairs.
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whole population.
Is it true then that networks allow political information flow (Putnam
1995; Putnam 2000) and contribute to spread the practical skills necessary to
take part in public life (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998)? The simulation
presented above is too simple to determine with detail how the flow of infor-
mation and the spread of skills take place. But it does prove that networks
facilitate these processes under certain circumstances that cannot be simply
reduced to the level of associationism and the consequent density of networks.
As Putnam claims, there might be a relationship between the number of asso-
ciations individuals belong to and the density of their civic networks. But the
relationship between the density and the efficiency of networks is, regardless of
the theory, far from obvious. To ground Putnam’s claims, explicit data about the
distribution of ties is needed —data that do not currently exist.
Figure 5. Diffusion Process in Scenario 2.
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The experiments that form this section are another attempt to overcome the lack
of empirical data, this time by being more explicit about the dynamics of social
capital networks. This part of the simulation does not treat networks as fixed
but as emerging structures that result from agents interactions. Again, the start-
ing point of the simulation are La Due Lake (1988) findings: their analysis
show that the larger the personal network of individuals, the more expertise
of its members, and the greater the frequency of interactions between them,
the more participation individuals have in political activities. The simulation
assumes that as political participation increases, the potential number of weak
ties is likely to increase as well. The programme models this by giving every
agent a level of political engagement that determines their number of possi-
ble weak ties: the higher the level of engagement, the higher the chances of
having weak ties. The rationale behind this assumption is intuitive: an indi-
vidual that takes active part in the political campaign of a candidate will have
a larger network of (politically-relevant) acquaintances than an individual
whose engagement is reduced to voting during the elections day. In order to
measure the level of expertise of personal networks, agents are given a level of
education and a level of knowledge about politics. The level of education is
distributed randomly when the model is initialised, but strong contacts share,
by default, the same education level. The level of knowledge about politics is
a random number with a maximum equal to the level of education of every
agent. This means that while the level of education is the same for agents and
their strong contacts, their knowledge about politics might differ substantially.
In order to measure the content dimension of social capital (as opposed to
the structural dimension captured by networks), agents are given two addi-
tional attributes: a stock of support and a stock of information. The stock of
support is a function of the size of the agent strong contacts network (the more
friends, the more support) and of the frequency of interactions (the more inter-
actions, the more cooperation). The stock of information is a function of the
size of the agent weak contacts (an empty list when the model is initialised) and
of the weak contacts’ level of knowledge about politics. The model assumes
that networks of strong contacts are redundant in the information they process,
and thus that only weak ties are sources of new information. Weak ties are also
interpreted as the bridges of shared experience that prevent the fragmentation
of ideas and knowledge, the «social glue» that join citizens together (Sunstein
2001, ch. 4). Figure 6 summarises the logic behind the introduction of these
attributes.
In every time step, agents have to decide whether to interact with one of their
strong contacts or to establish a (weak) tie with a new acquaintance. Agents
have limited time to invest in social relations so they have to choose between
interacting with existing strong ties and establishing new weak ones. When
an agent decides to establish a new weak tie, the dismissed strong contact
increases a memory of interactions refused by one. When that memory reaches
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refused, they will drop their tie. The threshold is a parameter that measures
the «strength» of strong ties. In this simulation, the parameter is given the
same value as the frequency of interactions. If a strong contact has a frequen-
cy of interactions of 3 (e.g. they meet 3 times per week), and has been refused
3 consecutive times, it will set the alarm on. When this happens, agents have
to decide whether to keep the strong contact or to add instead a new weak
contact to their network.
Different decision rules can be modelled to solve this choice. The rule used
in this simulation tries to capture the principle of minimization of loss and
maximization of gain: «Given the opportunity, actions are taken to fulfil both
motives. However, when the actor must make a choice, preference is given to
maintaining resources: the higher priority is given to the calculation that min-
imizes loss» (Lin 2001, p.131). Since minimizing loss has priority over maxi-
mizing gain, agents will choose to interact with the strong partner whatever
the net contribution to their stock of social capital. The impact of this decision
rule in the distribution of ties can be seen in table 5.
The mean of weak ties per hub stays between three and four across the
runs. But as the variance reveals, the distribution is quite scattered. Figure 7
shows that, indeed, the number of agents with three or fewer ties is much
higher than the number of agents with more than four ties for all the simula-
tion runs.
The reason why the number of agents with more than four weak ties is so
small lies in the constraints of the model. The number of potential weak ties
an agent can build depends on its political engagement. And to have a high
political engagement, three circumstances have to be met: (i) a large network
of strong contacts; (ii) a high level of political expertise in the network of strong
contacts; and (iii) a high level of interaction. Agents that meet these three cri-
Figure 6. Agent Attributes.
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as well. But it is not only the level of political engagement what matters. How
‘demanding’ strong contacts are is also an important variable in the equation:
agents have to satisfy their calls for interaction, and while they do that, they
cannot invest their time in building weak ties.
In order to compare the structural differences between a network emerging
from the principle of minimising loss and a network created randomly, another
simulation is run in scenario 3 (see page 180). In that simulation, and in order
to allow a comparison with the last simulation from table 5, hubs can build
up to a maximum of 10 weak ties. The results of the comparison are shown
in table 6.
The random network has a higher density and a shorter average path length
than the minimisation-of-loss network. This is a consequence of the indis-
criminate distribution of ties that underlies the emergence of random net-
works.
The minimisation-of-loss network has a distribution of ties that fits bet-
ter with the rich-get-richer effect of scale-free networks discussed above. It also
captures the intuition behind Pareto’s 80-20 rule: that a small fraction of peo-
ple always own a large fraction of the wealth (Barabási 2002; Buchanan 2002).
Table 5. Distribution of Ties following the Minimum Loss Principle.
Weak Ties
Simulation Run Mean Range Min Max Variance
1 4.04 9 1 10 6.562
2 3.50 8 1 9 4.839
3 3.17 9 1 10 4.488
4 3.77 10 1 11 5.586
5 3.65 8 1 9 4.990
6 3.50 8 1 9 4.823
7 3.64 8 1 9 5.407
8 3.56 9 1 10 5.629
9 3.89 9 1 10 5.305
10 3.53 9 1 10 4.775
Table 6. ‘Minimisation of Loss’ Network vs Random Network.
Distance Clustering Coefficient
Density (average path length) (cliquishness)
Random 0.0058 6.187* 0.009
Minimisation Loss 0.0049 7.144* 0.008
* among reachable pairs.
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defines the political engagement of agents than of the decision rule: it is a mat-
ter of time that all of them can achieve their maximum number of weak ties.
Agents have to be surrounded by very exigent strong contacts not to be able to
turn their potential number of weak ties into real acquaintances.
What can we learn from this simulation? In the first place, that social cap-
ital networks might display the same properties as the networks explored in
the previous section. Now, though, we have a behavioural rule that could be
explored empirically in order to allow further predictions about real networks.
The simulation also reinforces the idea that it is not only density that matters:
the distribution of connections plays an important role as well. If the right
Figure 7. Distribution of Weak Ties in each Simulation (continuation).
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the case for social capital networks, which means that the more efficient they
are in the diffusion of information, the lower the information costs for all indi-
viduals. That is the compensation everybody gets for the ‘aristocratic’ nature of
scale-free networks: since information is a public good, when one person gets
to know something, others will benefit as well (Sunstein 2001, p. 99), espe-
cially when the structure of the network promotes wide spread and rapid dif-
fusion.
Yet these results also open way to a rather different kind of interpreta-
tion. As information diffuses more efficiently, it becomes more of a public
good. And as the publicness of information increases, so does the likelihood
of free riding (Lazer 2003). In other words: there is an incentive for each
individual to let others pay the costs of getting information. The public
goods aspect of social capital was already remarked by Coleman in the late 80s
(Coleman 1988). Whether Coleman is right and social capital overcomes
the cooperation problem by becoming a sub-product of other actions is a
question that remains open and that can only be assessed by introducing
cooperation games in the simulation. For the purposes of this paper, though,
the simulation results are clear: linking social capital networks to the pro-
motion of cooperation is, at best, an assumption that lacks an unambigu-
ous foundation.
Figure 8. Distribution of Ties for Networks in Table 6.
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Social capital literature assumes that networks promote the diffusion of infor-
mation and skills, enhance cooperative behaviour, and reduce information
costs. Yet when applied to the field of political participation, the only units
available to measure networks are the number and type of associations indi-
viduals belong to, or fragments of networks that tell us very little about the
overall structure. With that information it is simply impossible to assess whether
the theoretical assumptions on the role networks play are founded or just a
way of begging the question. Given the lack of empirical data, this paper used
social simulation to create networks with different topological characteristics.
The experiments test the impact these different properties have on the processes
networks hold.
The first basic finding is that the density of networks is not a necessary
condition for their efficiency in the diffusion of information or resources.
While it is true that the more ties a network has, the closer individuals are of
each other, it is also true that the same effect can be obtained when the right
number of individuals has the right number of ties —even if the network
density is lower. The second basic finding is that social capital networks could,
indeed, reproduce the scale free distribution of ties and, therefore, be espe-
cially efficient in the diffusion of information or resources. A corollary of this,
though, is that the lower the costs of information are, the higher the chances
of getting free-riding behaviour. As access to information opens up, informa-
tion becomes more of a public good. And with public goods, there is always the
risk of slipping into the tragedy of the Commons: it is tempting for each indi-
vidual to let other individuals pay the costs of getting information; it is easy
to forget that they might be doing the same; and so, in the long run, it is
inevitable for everybody to lose their share.
Social capital theory still has to explain how networks promote cooperation
at the same time that they promote an efficient information diffusion. It has
to differentiate between density and efficiency, and between efficiency in the
transmission of information and efficiency in the promotion of cooperation.
Finally, when the outcome under analysis is democracy and political participa-
tion, a third distinction is needed: a normative definition of efficiency has to
be clearly delimited to compare it with the technical definition. A network
where all nodes are exclusively connected to a central node is highly efficient, but
it is closer to Orwell’s totalitarian society than to a civic community. Different
network designs can be equally effective in diffusing information or resources,
but designs do not contain information about the good or evil of their imple-
mentation. A normative criterion is necessary to define «efficiency» when applied
to the role networks play in the field of political participation.
Social capital assumptions are intuitively right, but in the detail, the theory
is full of misunderstandings and ambiguities about how networks work. It is by
paying attention to these details that a theory becomes robust and informative.
Simulation contributes to this analytical aim in two ways: it can delimit areas
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strategies able to bridge those gaps and find, at least, conceptual inconsistencies.
Even when the data is not yet available, simulation assumptions are always sus-
ceptible of empirical validation and therefore of being tested when the right
information is gathered. It can actually help to determine what kind of empiri-
cal information should be gathered. As opposed to what happens in most socio-
logical research, simulation allows a deductive approach to social capital.
6. Further Research
The simulation model presented here has two general limitations: the first,
methodological, results from an insufficient sensitivity analysis to the assump-
tions. A thorough statistical analysis of the simulation outputs is needed to
determine if they are significant or rather the effect of an accidental initialisa-
tion. The second limitation is empirical, and it refers to the absence of data
that allow the calibration of the model. The simulation assumptions would
be less arbitrary if richer data on real networks and their distribution of ties
were available. The ideal for future research would be to collect data using
social network methods, but individuals’ actual level of association could also
be used to root the distribution of weak ties. This would allow a deeper insight
into the scope of Putnam’s theory and his claim about the importance of asso-
ciationism for better democracies.
The simulation can also be extended to try to address some of the unan-
swered questions: the trade-off between the benefits that strong and weak con-
tacts bring can be reformulated to allow the decision rule to have a more sig-
nificant impact on the emerging network. Other decision rules can be
incorporated to enrich the range of plausible mechanisms underlying the for-
mation and maintenance of social capital networks. Individuals can be mod-
elled as normative agents that pursue cooperation unconditionally or as daring
investors that give priority to their new connections. Different strategies to
solve cooperation dilemmas would also allow a more methodical exploration
of the tension between the public nature of information and individuals’ coop-
erative behaviour. Overall, these extensions could contribute to developing
the conceptualization of social capital and exploring the causal mechanisms
that are currently ignored.
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